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HOW TO TELL WHETHER CHRISTIANS AND
MUSLIMS WORSHIP THE SAME GOD
Tomas Bogardus and Mallorie Urban

Do Muslims and Christians worship the same God? We answer: it depends.
To begin, we clear away some specious arguments surrounding this issue, to
make room for the central question: What determines the reference of a name,
and under what conditions do names shift reference? We’ll introduce Gareth
Evans’s theory of reference, on which a name refers to the dominant source of
information in that name’s “dossier,” and we then develop the theory’s notion
of dominance. We conclude that whether Muslims’ use of “Allah” co-refers with
Christians’ use of “God” depends on how much weight is given to what type of
information in the dossiers of these two names, and we offer a two-part test
by which the reader can determine whether Muslim and Christian uses of the
divine names co-refer: If Christianity were true and Islam false, might “Allah”
still refer to God? And: If Islam were true and Christianity false, might “God”
still refer to Allah? We explain the implications of your answers to those questions, and we close with a few reflections about what, in addition to reference,
might be required for worship, and whether, from a Christian perspective,
salvation turns on this issue.

Introduction
Do Muslims and Christians worship the same God? It depends. We propose, first, to clear away some specious arguments surrounding this issue:
an argument from the premise that Christians and Muslims are both classical theists; another argument from the premise that, if Christians and
Muslims don’t worship the same God, then at least one group is engaged
in absurdly misdirected worship; and a final argument alleging that since
Christians and Muslims have genuine disagreements over what God is
like, it follows that they must worship the same God. After that, we’ll consider what we think is a better argument, drawing from historical facts
about Muhammad’s use of “Allah” together with Saul Kripke’s causal
picture of reference. But we’ll raise objections to this argument that we
consider decisive.
The good news is that we’ll then be within reach of the philosophical
issue at the center of the “Same God?” question. Sameness of worship
requires sameness of reference. So answering our “Same God?” question requires reflecting on the nature and function of names. The central
question is not “what is the semantic contribution of a proper name to
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a sentence?” but rather “what determines the reference of a name, and
when and how do name-using practices shift their referents?”
We’ll introduce Gareth Evans’s theory of reference, on which a name
refers to the dominant source of information in that name’s “dossier,” the
body of information about the referent compiled by users of the name.
We then develop the theory’s notion of dominance, providing examples of
several common ways of weighting information in name-using practices.
We conclude that whether Muslims’ use of “Allah” co-refers with Christians’ use of “God” depends on how much weight is given to what type of
information in the dossiers of these two names, and we offer a two-part
test by which the reader can determine whether Muslim and Christian
uses of the divine names co-refer: if Christianity were true and Islam false,
might “Allah” still refer to God? And: if Islam were true and Christianity
false, might “God” still refer to Allah? We explain the implications of your
answers to those questions, and we close with a few reflections about what,
in addition to reference, might be required for worship, and whether, from
a Christian perspective, salvation turns on this issue.
Superficially Plausible Recent Arguments, with Objections
Our “Same God?” question rose to prominence in late 2015 and early
2016 due to the troubles of Dr. Laryicia Hawkins, a tenured associate professor of political science at Wheaton College, who was forced to resign
in large part because she answered the question affirmatively. In the wake
of Wheaton’s actions, several philosophers chimed in with arguments on
both sides of the issue, but mainly in opposition to Wheaton’s position. We
examine a few of those here.
The opening salvo came from Francis Beckwith, who pointed out
that, even though Christians and Muslims have different conceptions of
God, it’s nevertheless possible that they’re talking of and worshiping the
same God.1 (His example: two people with quite different conceptions of
Thomas Jefferson could still be speaking of the same man). We concur. But
then he goes on to argue for the Same-God conclusion like so:
What is known as classical theism was embraced by the greatest thinkers of
the Abrahamic religions: St. Thomas Aquinas (Christian), Moses Maimonides
(Jewish), and Avicenna (Muslim). Because, according to the classical theist,
there can only in principle be one God, Christians, Jews, and Muslims who
embrace classical theism must be worshipping the same God. It simply cannot be otherwise.2

We call Beckwith’s reasoning “The Argument from Monotheism,” and
we believe it goes like so:
1. Christians, Muslims, and Jews are classical theists.
Beckwith, “Do Muslims and Christians Worship the Same God?”
Beckwith, “Do Muslims and Christians Worship the Same God?”

1
2
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2. If classical theism is true, there can be only one God.
3. Therefore, Christians, Muslims, and Jews worship the same God.
We’re not convinced by this argument. Concerning premise (1), one may
reasonably wonder whether all members of these religions really are classical theists worshiping the God of the philosophers in the way Avicenna,
Maimonides, and Aquinas did, or even a sufficient number to ground the
claim that Christians and Muslims worship the same God. Have all or even
most or even ten thousand of these folks heard of divine simplicity, for example, let alone understood it, let alone endorsed it? It’s a heavy hike from
the prayer hall to the lecture hall, and few make it. Nevertheless, Beckwith’s
argument could easily be re-tooled to require only that Muslims, Jews, and
Christians are monotheists—a far more plausible claim.
But, even with that fix, the main inference of Beckwith’s argument
is invalid, and a quick counterexample helps see why. Perhaps fans of
Democritus, fans of Plato, and fans of Aristotle agree that only one of those
three can be the greatest philosopher. It hardly follows that these three
groups of fans celebrate the same philosopher as the greatest. Similarly, the
fact that Muslims, Christians, and Jews all believe in only one God doesn’t
prove that they all worship the same God. It could be that some of them
are wrong that the target of their worship is the God of classical theism, or
even wrong that the target of their worship exists.
That brings us to a second argument, this one from Michael Rea. Rea
reasons this way:
On the assumption that there is exactly one God, then, saying that someone
does not worship the same God as Christians do—as, for example, might
be the case with someone who claims to worship a perfectly evil being—
amounts to saying that they have not managed to worship any God at all
. . . [that] they are so wrong about what God is like that the word “God” in
their mouths is absolutely meaningless, or that they are inadvertently using
the word “God” to refer to some other thing that they mistakenly believe to
be divine—e.g., a mere human being, an animal or plant, [or] an inanimate
object like a rock or a star.3

We call this “The Argument from Absurdly Misdirected Worship,” and
we take Rea to be reasoning like this:
4. If there’s exactly one God, then if Christians and Muslims don’t worship the same God, then either “God” is meaningless for at least one
group, or “God” as used by at least one group refers to something
like an animal, a rock, a star, etc.
5. There is exactly one God.

Rea, “On Worshipping the Same God.”

3
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6. But “God” is not meaningless for at least one group, and for neither
group does “God” refer to something like an animal, a rock, a star,
etc.
7. So, Christians and Muslims worship the same God.
This argument finds its foothold only if we agree with Rea about the absurd dichotomy in (4) that is denied in (6). However, we think that Rea
presents his readers with a false dichotomy. Even if there’s exactly one
God, and even if Christians and Muslims don’t worship the same God,
it needn’t follow that at least one group is talking nonsense, or absurdly
mis-referring. There’s a third option not considered by Rea: it could be
that “God” for one group is meaningful, but refers to nothing at all. Take,
for example, “Zeus,” which is a meaningful but empty name.4 Zeusworshipers did not worship the same God as Christians and Muslims. But
it hardly follows that “Zeus” is meaningless, or that it refers to a rock, or a
star, or an animal. There is no Zeus, despite the fact that “Zeus” is meaningful. The lesson is: to say that Muslims and Christians don’t worship the
same God is not to say that either group is talking nonsense, or worshiping
a non-God. There are meaningful but empty names.
Finally, let us consider “The Argument from Disagreement,” from Dale
Tuggy.5 He reasons as follows:
In this “same god” dispute, a Christian, as such, ought not think of himself
as a neutral observer. Rather, he’s in the dispute qua Christian. So insofar as
you’re disputing with a Muslim about God, you are committed to the fact
that they are referring to God, when making (what are in your view) false
claims about him. Now many want to bring in Trinity theories here because
they hold these to be the crowning achievement and beating heart of Christian belief. OK, then, we have this dispute:
Muslim: “Allah/God is not triune.”
Trinitarian Christian: “God is triune.”
Do you take this to be a disagreement? If so, then you think the Muslim is talking about the same God you, the Trinitarian Christian, are talking about.6

We interpret Tuggy’s argument like so:
8. If Muslims and Christians genuinely disagree about God—for example, about whether God is triune—then they must be referring to
the same God.
4
Consider for example how these two sentences differ in meaning (and truth value):
“Zeus was the Greek god of thunder,” and “Poseidon was the Greek god of thunder.”
5
Tuggy, “The ‘Same God’ Controversy and Christian Commitment.” You can also find
a brief statement of this argument in Sullivan (“Semantics for Blasphemy,” 163), where she
says: “For debates between Jews, Christians, and Muslims to be substantive, ‘God,’ ‘Jesus,’
‘Jehovah,’ ‘Allah,’ and so on must corefer, even though speakers have quite different beliefs
about the being that serves as their referent.”
6
Tuggy, “The ‘Same God’ Controversy and Christian Commitment.”
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9. Muslims and Christians genuinely disagree about God.
10. So, Muslims and Christians refer to the same God.7
We have the following reservations about premise (8) in this argument.
The mere fact that two people disagree about a sentence of the form “a is
F” does not guarantee that they’re referring to the same thing, because it
does not guarantee even that there exists some object to which they’re both
referring. Suppose, for example, that we disagree over whether Zeus—
Greek god of thunder, son of Cronus and Rhea—suffered from Youngest
Child Syndrome. It doesn’t follow that there is some thing, Zeus, about
which we disagree. There is no Zeus, and there never has been, so we
cannot disagree about him. This serves as a counterexample to the general
principle that lies behind and explains Tuggy’s premise (8).
But perhaps you think there’s something suspicious about using an
empty name (“Zeus”) for a counterexample to Tuggy’s premise.8 Perhaps
Tuggy could retrench, and argue that: if Christians and Muslims genuinely disagree while using the same name (“God is Triune” against “God
is not Triune”), and that name is not empty for at least one of these groups,
then it’s not empty for the other group, indeed the other group refers to
the very same entity with that name. And, since Christians and Muslims
insist that the divine name is not empty in their mouths, each group ought
to accept that the other speaks of the same divine being.9
Unfortunately, even this revised principle is vulnerable to refutation
by counterexample, since one and the same name can undergo reference
shift over time—or across groups that use the same name in different
ways—and disagreements can emerge with different uses of this one
name. The following is based on actual events: a young girl was raised by
loving, excellent parents loath to initiate her into the mythic Santa Claus
cult that lately enshrouds Christmas like a toxic cloud. So, instead, they
taught her many truths about Saint Nicholas, including the truth that over
time he became known as “Santa Claus,” and the truth that he died long
ago. When she was four years old, this young girl overheard her cousins
sharing various truths in the Santa Claus fiction, for example that Santa
Claus would soon deliver presents for them. Our puzzled heroine piped
7
Though this conclusion is about reference and not worship, one might think that, by
proving co-reference, the largest hurdle to co-worship has been passed. If Christians and
Muslims are talking about the same God, it’s smooth sailing, one might think, to the conclusion that, on other occasions, they worship the same God.
8
Maybe you’re a sucker for baroque ontologies, and according to you “Zeus” refers to
something that exists—e.g., an abstract object—but which is very much unlike what the
Greeks took him for (e.g., concrete). The subsequent counterexample should assuage your
concerns. In that case, even if “Santa Claus,” as used by most children, refers on your view
to an abstract object that could not possibly be jolly, elvish, etc., it does not do so in the
mouths of children initiated into the practice that has preserved the name’s reference to Saint
Nicholas. This one name, used in two different ways, can be a vehicle for genuine disagreement, even though its reference varies in the two practices.
9
We suspect this is what Tuggy was getting at with his talk of Christians engaging in this
dispute qua Christians, that they are not “neutral observers,” etc.
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up: “But . . . Santa Claus is dead.” Her cousins, with shock and urgency we
can’t convey, insisted through tears that Santa Claus is very much alive.
Things got heated, looking and sounding every bit like a disagreement,
and requiring the prompt attention of the girls’ parents. Now, the girls
were all using the same name, “Santa Claus.” However, in our young
heroine’s mouth, “Santa Claus” referred to Saint Nicholas. Not so in her
cousins’ mouths. Despite the disagreement using the same name, they
were not speaking of the same entity, due to the way “Santa Claus” has for
some users shifted its reference over time, from a real entity to a creature
of fiction.
(If you insist that this was not a genuine disagreement among the young
girls, since they were not talking about the same entity, and that’s just part
of what you mean by “genuine disagreement,” then Tuggy’s argument becomes question begging. Premise (9) would, on this reading, trivially entail
sameness of referent, and nobody unsure of Tuggy’s conclusion should
grant his premises. In other words, on this reading Tuggy’s premise (9)
is just another way of putting the issue at hand: with regard to Trinitarianism etc., are Christians and Muslims engaged in genuine disagreements?
Sure, it looks and sounds like they’re engaged in genuine disagreements,
but the “Santa Claus” case above shows you that appearances can be deceiving. And so our task would become to determine whether what look
and sound like genuine theological disagreements between Muslims and
Christians really are, i.e., whether Christians and Muslims refer to the
same God. That’s our project below).
This sort of reference shift may be what’s happening in the case of
Christians and Muslims, for all Tuggy says. It could be that, though early
Muslims inherited generic divine names—these days rendered as “God”
and “Allah”—from their Jewish and Christian neighbors, the names, as
they use them, have shifted reference. And so, despite their theological
disagreement, Muslims and Christians may not speak of (or worship) the
same God. We conclude that, even on its most charitable interpretation,
Tuggy’s premise (8) is false, and so his argument for the Same-God conclusion fails.
A Better, Kripkean Argument, with Objections
Saul Kripke is famous in part for arguing against descriptivism, the
view that names are abbreviated or disguised definite descriptions. We
agree with Kripke’s four core objections to descriptivism. Names can’t
be abbreviated definite descriptions because: (i) names can, thinking
counterfactually, pick out something different from the description associated with it,10 and (ii) it’s psychologically possible not to associate any
10
Here’s Kripke (Naming and Necessity, 75): “Suppose we do decide to pick out the reference of ‘Hitler,’ as the man who succeeded in having more Jews killed than anyone else
managed to do in history. That is the way we pick out the reference of the name; but in
another counterfactual situation where someone else would have gained this discredit, we
wouldn’t say that in that case that other man would have been Hitler.”
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definite description with a name that nevertheless refers,11 and (iii) it’s
possible that, in the actual world, the name doesn’t refer to whatever is
picked out by the definite description,12 and, finally, (iv) it’s possible that
the associated definite description doesn’t refer to anything at all, though
the name does.13
So, for Kripke, reference is not a purely psychological matter, i.e., not
settled entirely by the conception associated with a name. He famously
proposed an alternative view, on which historical and causal relations
are also crucial to determining reference. According to the common interpretation of Kripke’s causal “picture” of reference, names are introduced
in something like a baptism ceremony—“I hereby dub thee . . . ”—when
reference is fixed by ostension or by description. After the baptism, names
are passed on to other speakers, who form, as it were, links on a chain.
These new speakers may change the spelling or sound of the name, and
they may have quite different conceptions associated with the name. But,
so long as those new speakers in this causal chain intend to use the name
in the conventional way—i.e., the same way as those from whom they
inherited the name—they do use the name in that way, and reference is
preserved.14
The applicability of this causal picture of reference to the “Same God?”
question is straightforward. As a matter of fact, Muhammad inherited
11
Kripke again (Naming and Necessity, 81): “the man in the street . . . may still use the name
‘Feynman.’ When asked he will say: well he’s a physicist or something. He may not think
that this picks out anyone uniquely. I still think he uses the name ‘Feynman’ as a name for
Feynman.”
12
Kripke (Naming and Necessity, 83–84) asks us to imagine someone who uses the name
“Gödel” to mean the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Suppose it turned
out that Gödel was not in fact the author of the theorem, but he instead stole the work from
a man, Schmidt, “whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many
years ago.” Still, Kripke points out, the name “Gödel” would refer to Gödel, and not Schmidt.
13
Kripke (Naming and Necessity, 86–87): “Suppose, to vary the example about Gödel, no
one had discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic-perhaps the proof simply materialized
by a random scattering of atoms on a piece of paper—the man Gödel being lucky enough
to have been present when this improbable event occurred. Further, suppose arithmetic is
in fact complete. . . . So even if the conditions are not satisfied by a unique object the name
may still refer.”
14
See, for example, Kripke (Naming and Necessity, 79, 91 ff.). Kripke is careful to say that
he’s not interested in providing a theory of reference, i.e., a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for reference (Naming and Necessity, 93, 96), in part because the notion of reference
remains central but unanalyzed in his “picture” of reference, in part because of problems
we’ll look at below, and in part because he was, as he says, “sort of too lazy at the moment.”
What we give here in the text is a common interpretation of Kripke—or, perhaps better, an
extrapolation of Kripke—on which reference of a name is determined by tracing a causalhistorical chain of uses of that name—a name-using practice—and a speaker becomes a link
on that chain if and only if he intends to use the name in the same way as those from whom
he inherited the name. For examples of this unannounced extrapolation of Kripke’s “picture”
into a theory, see Sullivan “Semantics for Blasphemy” and Burgess “Madagascar Revisited.”
Soon, we’ll raise objections to this common interpretation of Kripke, specifically to the sufficiency of that shared intention for reference preservation. But we hasten to add that Kripke
himself stopped short of endorsing this common interpretation, though he does seem optimistic about the necessity of that shared intention for reference preservation (Naming and
Necessity, 96).
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the name “Allah” (or, rather, the name which we now spell “Allah”) from
surrounding Christians and Jews, and specifically its use to pick out the
God of Abraham, the sole, maximally excellent creator of the world. He
intended to use the name in the same way; he intended to refer to the
same God that Christians and Jews referred to with “Allah.” So, it looks
like a Kripkean causal theory of reference would have it that Muhammad
thereby entered that name-using practice tracing back to Abraham, a
chain which dovetails with contemporary Christian use of “God,” even
if what Muhammad went on to say about “Allah” was largely or entirely
false. And, in that case, “Allah” (as used by Muslims) and “God” (as used
by Christians) refer to the same entity, opening the door for Muslims and
Christians to worship the same God.
But there are problems with this common interpretation of Kripke,
with this causal theory of reference described above. Namely: not just any
historical chain of uses of a name will preserve reference, even when each
link in the chain intends to use the name in the same way as the source
of the name. Kripke himself was aware of the troubling case of “Santa
Claus,” which we discussed in the last section. He says, “There may be a
causal chain from our use of the term ‘Santa Claus’ to a certain historical
saint, but still the children, when they use this, by this time probably do
not refer to that saint.”15 The reference of “Santa Claus” has shifted from
the flesh-and-blood Saint Nicholas to the fictional jolly Nordic elf. And
this is so even if every user of the name intended to use it in the conventional way. At some point in the past, the name-using practice went awry,
and the chain broke that once connected “Santa Claus” to Saint Nicholas.
There was a reference shift, from the real Saint Nicholas to fiction.
Kripke was also aware of an early objection from Gareth Evans16 involving the name “Madagascar.” This name seems to share its early
lineage with that of our present-day name “Mogadishu,” and it originally
referred to that peninsular region of present-day Somalia. But, due to a
misunderstanding of the locals on the part of Marco Polo (or his scribe),
“Madagascar” came to refer to that large island off the eastern coast of
Africa.17 Again, we have a reference shift despite the intentions of each
user of the name to share one name-using practice, and to preserve reference. Sometimes, the fact that two names have the same origin and also were
passed along by speakers with intentions to use them as their originators did isn’t
enough to guarantee that the names refer to the same thing. And, so, this
may have happened with Muslims’ use of “Allah,” for some or all of the
stretch between Muhammad’s religious experiences on the Mountain of
Light and the present day.
Summing up, there is a superficially plausible argument for an affirmative answer to our “Same God?” question that is rooted in a Kripkean
Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 93.
Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” 195–196.
17
For a detailed history of this case, see Burgess “Madagascar Revisited.”
15
16
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causal picture of reference. However, this argument relies on a controversial extrapolation of that Kripkean picture of reference, which Kripke
himself was reluctant to endorse: namely, the claim that a shared intention on the part of each “link” in the causal chain to use the name in the
conventional way is sufficient to preserve reference, i.e., to avoid reference
shift. But since reference shifts can occur despite the best, most deferential
intentions on the part of users of the name, that crucial premise in the
argument is false, and so this argument cannot settle our “Same God?”
question. Set it aside, then, along with the unsuccessful arguments from
Beckwith, Rea, and Tuggy. In the following sections, we’ll try our hand at
answering the “Same God?” question. First, we’ll lay out what we take to
be the theoretical issue at the heart of our “Same God?” question. Then,
we’ll be in a position to apply that theoretical issue to the question at hand.
The Core Issue
We assume that sameness of worship requires sameness of reference:
Muslims and Christians worship the same God only if they refer to the
same God.18 And, so, we take it that the central issue is not what the semantic contribution of a proper name is to a sentence; neither Millianism
nor Fregeanism would settle our “Same God?” question. To answer that
question, on Millianism, we’d still need to know whether the names “God”
and “Allah” contribute the same object to sentences that feature them.
And, to answer the “Same God?” question on Fregeanism, we’d similarly
need to know whether the same object answers to the senses associated
with “God” and “Allah.”19 We’d need to know, that is, on both views, what
“God” (as used by Christians) and “Allah” (as used by Muslims) refer
to. So, the central issue is how names acquire—and perhaps shift—their
referents.

18
de Ridder and van Woudenberg (“Referring to, Believing in, and Worshipping the
Same God,” 59) agree: “Worship of God, we said, requires belief in God. And there can be
no adequate belief in God unless there is reference to God.” We’re not sure whether worship requires belief. But it is an activity intended to be transferred to an object, by means
of mental representations. And if Muslims and Christians aren’t transferring their worship
activity onto the same object—if those representations aren’t co-referring—then they’re not
worshiping the same God. True, as we’ll discuss below, perhaps God might credit worship
directed elsewhere as worship directed to him (the way Christ credits charity done to others
as charity done to him in Matthew 25). But this wouldn’t change the fact that the worship
was directed elsewhere. We thank an anonymous referee for encouraging us to think about
this assumption more deeply; we agree it merits further thought, and more than we can give
it here.
19
For interesting suggestions that proper names function in a Millian way in some contexts and in a Fregean way in other contexts, see McKinsey (“Truths Containing Empty
Names”) and Tiedke (“Proper Names and the Fictional Uses”). McKinsey thinks that names
generally refer directly, contributing only their referents to the meaning of a sentence, but that
in cases of “epistemic distance” between the user of a name and the object named, proper
names may function in a Fregean way. Tiedke holds a similar view of fictional discourse,
and though she doesn’t consider religious discourse, what Tiedke says about fiction may be
extended to religious discourse.
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As we said above, we agree with Kripke’s criticisms of descriptivism:
there’s more to reference than “fit” between conception and object. Yet
Kripke’s causal picture has problems of its own: while names begin with
a baptism, and are propagated causally from user to user as though by
links on a chain, nevertheless reference can shift over the life of a name.
The fact that two people use the same name does not guarantee that they
refer to the same object. So, while Kripke provides a nice story of the lives
of names, his picture is less satisfying when extrapolated into a theory of
reference. Now, pinning down an exact, detailed theory of reference is beyond the scope of this paper. But we think the truth lies in the direction of
Gareth Evans’s theory of reference, introduced in his 1973 work, and further developed in his 1982 book, which unfortunately was left unfinished
at his premature death.
Evans departs from Kripke in this: a name-using practice in a community links a name word with a body of information about its referent, a
catalogue of characteristics, what Evans sometimes calls a dossier. Now,
for Evans, a name does not refer to whatever answers to most (or a
weighted most) of entries in this dossier—that would just be a species of
descriptivism. And neither, pace Kripke, does a name refer to whatever
was originally dubbed by that name, irrespective of the information in
the name’s dossier, or the source of that information. Rather, for Evans,
a name refers to the object that is the dominant source of the information
in the name’s dossier. In this way, Evans’s theory marries the insights of
Kripke’s causal picture of reference with the insights of descriptivism.
Think of it like this: a name-using practice is a bit like a file folder, labeled with the name word (at the baptism ceremony), and shared within a
community. The community collects scraps of information about the object
named, and adds that information to the folder. A simple descriptivism
says that the name refers to whatever best fits the information within the
folder. Problem: if misinformation gets into the folder, on this view the
name will implausibly shift reference. (If Schmidt but not Gödel proved
the incompleteness of arithmetic, for example, this simple descriptivism
would misidentify Schmidt as the referent of “Gödel.”) A simple Kripkean
theory would have it that the name refers to whatever was dubbed in that
baptism ceremony, even if that object poorly fits the (mis)information in
the folder, and even if the name shifts reference over time. (This simple
Kripkean theory would implausibly identify Saint Nicholas as the referent
of the modern child’s use of “Santa Claus,” since the name traces back to
a dubbing of the saint). Evans’s theory says that reference doesn’t track
with “fit,” nor with dubbing, but rather with the dominant source of the information in the folder. (Since Gödel remains the dominant source of our
information about him, even if crucial parts are misinformation, “Gödel”
refers to him).
Evans’s theory has a nice explanation of reference shift. For example,
“Madagascar” now names an island off the coast of Africa, and not a portion of the mainland, as it originally named. This is not because that island
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best fits the body of information we associate with the name (that would
be a kind of descriptivism), and not because that island was originally
baptized as “Madagascar” (as a matter of historical fact, it wasn’t). Rather,
it’s because that island became, through Marco Polo’s error, the dominant
causal source of the body of information we associate with “Madagascar,”
e.g., being a large island off the eastern coast of Africa, being home to
fossas, panther chameleons, aye-ayes, etc. Evans also gives this, imaginary
case of reference shift:
Two babies are born, and their mothers bestow names upon them. A nurse
inadvertently switches them and the error is never discovered. It will henceforth undeniably be the case that the man universally known as “Jack” is so
called because a woman dubbed some other baby with the name.20

Here, too, a name (“Jack”) refers to an object not because that object best
fits the name’s dossier (descriptivism), and not because that object was
dubbed as “Jack” (he wasn’t; his twin was, prior to the nurse’s switch).
Rather, that man becomes known as “Jack” because he becomes, over
time, the dominant source of information in the name’s dossier. Our file
folder labeled “Jack” slowly fills up with information that traces back to
him.21
And consider what Evans would say about a case of reference shift
from fact to fiction. At one time, Saint Nicholas was the dominant source of
information associated with the name “Santa Claus.” But at some point—
perhaps around the 1823 publication of the poem “The Night Before
Christmas”—the dossier associated with “Santa Claus” came under heavy
pollution by mythmakers and tale-spinners. In such a case, it would be
wrong to interpret Evans’s theory as entailing that the mythmakers are the
sources of the fanciful information entering the name’s dossier, so that
the name refers to them. Rather, in the case of fiction, there is, strictly
speaking, no object that is the causal source of the information. (That’s
what makes it fiction, and the name empty). Evans himself 22 briefly remarks on such cases: “Legend and fancy can create new characters, or add
bodies of source-less material to other dossiers; restrictions on the causal
Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” 196.
Consider also a case from Mark Sainsbury (Reference without Referents, 114–115): “I am
on the ridge in full view of two conspicuous mountains, c and d. A local points to c and tells
me that it is called Ammag. I take him to have pointed to d, a mountain just above which
hovers the only cloud in the sky. I say ‘There’s a cloud above Ammag.’ I manifestly intend
to use ‘Ammag’ as they used it, and I intend to use ‘Ammag’ for d. The intentions are not
compatible. Does this use count as one within their practice?” According to Sainsbury, if the
local corrects me, and I defer to the local’s correction, then I have manifested my intention to
conform to the locals’ name-using practice, and I have thereby joined that practice, referring
to c and saying false things of it. However, if, after my utterance, all the locals are destroyed
in an avalanche, and I make it to a new village and initiate those villagers into my use of
“Ammag,” then mountain d would come to be known as Ammag. In this case, the reference
shift is due to the purging of the dossier, as it were, when the community that was using the
name was (almost) completely destroyed. After the purge, the dossier is replenished with
scraps of information about mountain d.
22
Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” 200.
20
21
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relation would prevent the inventors of the legends turning out to be the
sources of the beliefs their legends gave rise to.” At a certain point—and
it is vague when this happened—the information in the dossier of “Santa
Claus” became largely source-less. So, the information ceased to have a
dominant source, and therefore the name ceased to refer to anything.23
Thus, according to Evans’s theory, whether Christians and Muslims
refer to the same God with their uses of divine names will depend on
whether the same object is the dominant source of information associated
with each name-using practice. For our purposes, as will become clear,
it is crucial that we focus on—and further develop—Evans’s notion of
dominance. What is it for an object to be the dominant source of information in a name’s dossier? As Evans himself acknowledges,24 dominance
cannot be a simple function of the amount of information in the dossier. An
object might contribute an enormous amount of information to a name’s
dossier, without thereby becoming the referent of the name, because the
information contributed is peripheral and unimportant relative to other
information in the dossier. For example, we might mistake a stranger for
your colleague named “Jennifer,” learn only that the stranger loves all the
natural numbers, and thereby pollute the dossier for “Jennifer” with information like “She loves the number 1,” “She loves the number 2,” and so
on, until these entries outnumber the entries originating from your actual
colleague, Jennifer herself. We think it’s obvious that “Jennifer” would not
thereby come to name this stranger.25
So, dominance is not a function of amount of information in a dossier.
What matters more is the centrality of the information to the conception of
the object. As Evans says, “the believer’s reasons for being interested in the
item at all will weigh.”26 There are several different types of information
that can be given priority in a name’s dossier, depending on the nameuser’s reasons for being interested in the object. Next, we’ll describe some
common ways of weighting information in a name’s dossier, and we’ll
come out the other side with a clearer understanding of Evans’s dominance.
Then, we’ll apply that understanding to our “Same God?” question.
Dominance
Sometimes—rarely—we have reason to place maximal weight on some
contingent attribute or feature of the object named. As Evans puts it, in
23
Meghan Sullivan (“Semantics for Blasphemy”) cleverly applies Gareth Evans’s picture
of reference to explain the chief danger of blasphemy: polluting the dossier of a divine name
with misinformation may well cause the name to shift its reference from a divine being to fiction, i.e., to nothing at all. So religious communities who desire to maintain linguistic contact
with the divine do well to guard against blasphemy.
24
Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” 201.
25
If we were to say to each other, on the basis of our new information, “Jennifer loves the
number 493,” we would say something—likely false—of your colleague, not something true of
that stranger. This shows that “Jennifer” does not shift its reference to the stranger, despite
its dossier being swamped by a large amount of information about that stranger.
26
Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” 201.
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this way “a name is used with the over-riding intention of referring to
something satisfying such and such a description.”27 An example from
Keith Donnellan serves well:
[T]he chairman of the local Teetotalers Union . . . has just been informed that
a man is drinking a martini at their annual party. He responds by asking
his informant, “Who is the man drinking a martini?” In asking the question
the chairman does not have some particular person in mind about whom
he asks the question; if no one is drinking a martini, if the information is
wrong, no person can be singled out as the person about whom the question was asked. . . . [T]he attribute of being the man drinking a martini is
all-important, because if it is the attribute of no one, the chairman’s question
has no straightforward answer.28

Donnellan dubs this an “attributive” use of the definite description. And
we can see a similar “attributive” use of a name, if we imagine the chairman
to have introduced a name on this occasion. Let’s use “Marty Martini.”
In this case, what first and foremost guides the name “Marty Martini,”
as it is sent out into the world, is some set of attributes. Those predicates
are given maximal weight in the name’s dossier, and are considered individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the proper application of the
name. If there is a man drinking a martini at the party, he’s Marty Martini.
If there is no such man, then “Marty Martini” finds no target; it fails to
refer. If someone were to claim “We’ve found the man drinking a martini
at the annual party, but it turns out he’s not Marty Martini” the proper
response to such confusion would be “Oh, I thought we were just using
‘Marty Martini’ to name the man drinking a martini at the annual party.”29
Far more commonly, names are not used in this “attributive” way; as
we’ve seen, names don’t always stick to the object that best fits the descriptive information in the dossier. And we have reason to grant names the
flexibility to maintain their reference even if a large part of our descriptive
information about their referents is erroneous. As Evans says: “Malicious
rumours, or absurdly inflated claims, equally baseless, may circulate, and
such misinformation may be all that ends up associated with the name in
the minds of consumers [of the name]. Nevertheless, they have got hold of
rumours and claims about a particular man.”30 So, again, fit is not the whole
story of reference: typically, perfect fit is not sufficient, and neither is it
necessary. The history connecting the object to the name-using practice is

Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” 205.
Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” 287.
29
A real-life example of a name used in a paradigmatically “attributive” way is “Jack the
Ripper.” The name was introduced with an overriding intention to refer to whomever committed all those heinous crimes. If it turned out that nobody committed the crimes—that they
were a series of bizarre and tragic accidents, say—or that multiple criminals were involved,
“Jack the Ripper” would find no referent. But it could never be that one man committed all
those crimes in question, and yet “Jack the Ripper” did not refer to him.
30
Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 385.
27
28
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also important, such that it’s possible for a name to refer even given a high
degree of mismatch between conception and referent.
But there are limits. Even in our most common use of names, some
core information is given maximal, sine-qua-non weight. In extreme cases,
reference can fail due to radical incongruity between an object and our
conception of it. To illustrate, consider this case from Evans:
We learn for example from E. K. Chambers’ Arthur of Britain that Arthur had
a son Anir “whom legend has perhaps confused with his burial place.” If
Kripke’s notion of reference fixing is such that those who said Anir was a
burial place of Arthur might be denoting a person it seems that it has little
to commend it.31

In other words, if we take “Anir” to name Arthur’s burial place, and then
we find out that in fact it was Arthur’s son who was known as “Anir,” the
proper response is not to conclude that we’d been referring to his son all
along, and saying falsely that he was the burial place of Arthur. Rather,
due to the radical mismatch between our conception of a son of Arthur
and the burial place of Arthur—due to a violation of that fundamental necessary condition for the name’s application—we ought to conclude that
our prior use of “Anir” referred to nothing at all, since the name traces
back to his son, who is very much unlike a burial place.
Other examples may be supplied. Plausibly it’s this eventual radically
high degree of mismatch that explains the reference shift of “Santa Claus”:
the stories were so fantastic that we judged them to be source-less fiction
about nobody, rather than misinformation about Saint Nicholas. This fundamental “degree of fit” requirement would also explain reference failure
for “Jesus Christ,” if it turned out, as at least one scholar had it, that there
was no such Nazarene but only a hallucinogenic mushroom, the early
Church being a clandestine sex-and-mushroom cult.32
It may also happen that we weight the information in a name’s dossier
so as to use the name deferentially. To use the name, that is, as Evans puts
it, “with the over-riding intention to conform to the use made of them by
some other person or persons,” to the leaders of the name-using practice.33 Tyler Burge’s famous “arthritis” case nicely illustrates this type
of deferential practice, and the lessons carry over to deferential uses of
proper names.34 Burge’s imagined patient says “I have arthritis in my leg”
and speaks falsely—even though his (mistaken) conception of arthritis
allows for arthritis to exist outside the joints—because it is distinctive of
our communal use of medical terms like “arthritis” to defer to the use of

Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” 189.
Allegro, The Sacred Mushroom and the Cross. Yes, sex and magic mushrooms. And you
thought contemporary styles of worship were getting out of hand.
33
Evans, “The Causal Theory of Names,” 205.
34
Burge, “Individualism and the Mental.”
31
32
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medical experts.35 What goes here for the medical term also goes for the
deferential use of proper names. When we use a name deferentially, it is
as if we release the name into the world like an arrow from a bow, saying
to ourselves as we line up our shot: “Whatever else this thing is, it is first
and foremost what the experts say it is.” That part of the dossier—the part
containing the relevant information about those experts—is given greatest
weight. This is why, for example, Burge’s imagined patient continues to
refer to arthritis, and speak falsely of it, despite how badly he’s misconceived the condition.
Finally, we might weight the information in a name’s dossier so as to
use the name demonstratively. To use it, that is, with an overriding intention to refer to an object of acquaintance, e.g., that man or that moving
object. In this way, the entries in the name’s dossier featuring demonstratives are given greatest weight. When we use a name demonstratively, it is
as if we say to ourselves as we aim, “Whatever else this thing is, it is first
and foremost this thing here before me.” One can draw a nice example of
this demonstrative use of names from Donnellan:
Suppose one is at a party and, seeing an interesting-looking person holding
a martini glass, one asks, “Who is the man drinking a martini?” If it should
turn out that there is only water in the glass, one has nevertheless asked a
question about a particular person, a question that it is possible for someone
to answer.36

Donellan calls this a “referential” use of a definite description. But suppose we introduce a name for this interesting-looking person: “Captain
Martini.” That name still refers to that person, even if it should turn out to
be a woman drinking water and not a man with a martini, because what
was given primary weight in the introduction of the name was the fact
that Captain Martini is this person here, this object of acquaintance. Whatever else is true of Captain Martini—even if she’s a teetotaling martini
despiser—she’s this person here.
To sum up, a name refers to the dominant source of information in its
dossier, if there be any one dominant source. If, as in Evans’s twin case, and
in the case of “Madagascar,” a new object begins to contribute information
in a name’s dossier, that new object may eventually become known as that
name; that name may come to refer to it. If, as in the case of “Santa Claus,”
source-less information comes to dominate a dossier, the name becomes
empty. Dominance is not a function of the sheer amount of information
contributed; it’s a function of how central or important the information
is to our conception of the object. If it’s an object of our acquaintance, we
35
When Burge imagines the patient is informed by his doctor that arthritis is an inflammation of the joints, “[t]he patient is surprised, but relinquishes his view and goes on to
ask what might be wrong with his thigh.” This response manifests his disposition to defer,
and fuels our externalist intuitions in Burge’s case, i.e., that the meaning of “arthritis” in the
patient’s mouth is given not by his mistaken conception (inside his skull), but by the larger
communal linguistic practice (the shared dossier outside his skull).
36
Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions,” 287.
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will likely use the name demonstratively, weighting heavily information in
the dossier containing demonstratives. If it’s an object we know only by
description, and not by acquaintance, we may use the name attributively,
with an overriding intention to refer to an object bearing the relevant attributes. If it’s a subject of expertise, we will likely use the name deferentially,
weighting heavily that part of the name’s dossier with relevant information about experts. And, in all these uses, there will be some “degree of fit”
requirement on the application of a name: reference fails in the event of a
radical mismatch between information in a name’s dossier and the source
of that information.
Behold, name-ology is complicated. Fortunately, we can summarize all
these lessons about dominance into one simple test. We can check whether
some bit of information in a name’s dossier is given sine-qua-non weight
by asking “What if nothing in the world answered to that bit of the dossier? Could the name still refer?” Notice how we’ve already run this test
a few times in this section: could “Marty Martini” refer to someone at the
party without that person having drunk a martini? No. This shows that
the information about what he’s drunk was given sine-qua-non weight in
the use of this name.37 Could “Anir,” supposing it names Arthur’s burial
place, have referred to his son? No. This shows that some information in
the dossier—perhaps that the referent is a hollowed-out patch of dirt—inconsistent with being a human, is given sine-qua-non weight in the use of
that name. Could Burge’s arthritis man have arthritis in his thigh despite
the assurance of the medical community that this is impossible? No. This
shows that information about deference to medical experts was given sinequa-non weight in the use of that medical term. Could “Captain Martini”
fail to refer to this person here in the above example? No. That shows that
certain demonstrative information was given sine-qua-non weight in the
use of that name.
This test can help us determine whether two names—or two uses of one
name by two groups—have the same referent. For example, take “Santa
Claus,” as used by present-day children, and the name “Saint Nicholas.”
We can check whether “Santa Claus,” as used by children now, co-refers
with the name “Saint Nicholas,” by asking: what if nothing in the world
answered to the information in our dossier for “Santa Claus,” but something in the world answered perfectly to the information in our dossier for
“Saint Nicholas?” Could “Santa Claus” refer to that thing? If the answer is
“Yes,” this shows that there’s nothing in the dossier for “Santa Claus” that
is given sine-qua-non weight, and yet is too radical of a mismatch with any
information in the dossier for “Saint Nicholas” to allow reference. In that
case the names might co-refer. If, on the other hand, the answer is “No,”
this shows that something in the dossier for “Santa Claus” is given sine37
Could Marty Martini be a Republican? Sure he could. This shows that information
about his political leanings was not given sine-qua-non weight in the dossier of his name.
We leave it to the reader to provide similar pieces of information which are not given such
weight in the subsequent examples.
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qua-non weight, and is so radically incongruous with some information in
the dossier for “Saint Nicholas” that the names cannot co-refer.
We believe the answer to this question is “No,” because some crucial
information in the present-day use of “Santa Claus”—information about
being a jolly Nordic elf who delivers presents globally on Christmas—
radically mismatches some information in the dossier for “Saint
Nicholas”—e.g., that he was human, not an elf, that he’s got no global
delivery service, that he’s dead, etc. That jolly Nordic elf information is
so central to the contemporary use of “Santa Claus” that, even if Saint
Nicholas is the source of much of the other information in the dossier of
“Santa Claus,” Saint Nicholas cannot be the dossier’s dominant source, i.e.,
the referent of the name. Rather, the name has shifted its reference, in this
case, to the source of that central, crucial (mythical) information, i.e., to
fiction.
In the next section, we will apply these lessons to the question of
whether Christians and Muslims worship the same God. We’ll show how
a few basic historical facts can combine with the test just described in
order to help us answer our motivating question.
Do Christians and Muslims Worship the Same God?
As we argued above, a name refers to the dominant source of information
in its dossier, if there be any one dominant source. Reference shift occurs
when there is a shift in the dominant source of information in a name’s
dossier. And dominance is not a function of sheer amount of information,
but rather the centrality or weight given to information in the dossier.
“Santa Claus” shifted reference from Saint Nicholas to a fictional character because information contributed by mythmakers and tale spinners
became central in the dossier. And we can prove this information became
dominant by asking: “What if there were no jolly Nordic elf who delivers
presents each Christmas, but there were a bishop of Myra who did such
and such and is now dead? Might ‘Santa Claus’ refer to that bishop?” And
all the children cry “No!” When they learn the true story, they conclude
there is no Santa Claus; there is only some other guy, Saint Nicholas. This is
how we demonstrate the reference shift.
We can reason in a similar way with respect to the divine-name-using
practices of Christians and Muslims. As a matter of historical fact, there is
no doubt that the use of “Allah” by Muslims traces back to—and branched
off from—the divine-name-using practices of Jews and Christians, just as
our practice of using “Santa Claus” traces back to and branches off from
the use of names for Saint Nicholas. And what’s distinctive about the use
of “Allah” by Muslims is the information that Muslims have added to the
dossier of “Allah,” just as what’s distinctive about the contemporary use of
“Santa Claus” is the updated information in its dossier. From a Christian
perspective, the information added by Muslims into the dossier of “Allah”
does not trace back, ultimately, to God himself; the added information was
spurious. So, from a Christian perspective, if that new information in the
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dossier of “Allah” became central, then the dominant source of information in the dossier is no longer God, and so the name has shifted reference
away from God, to fiction.
We can run the same test for dominance that we ran in the “Santa
Claus” case. We ask ourselves: “What if there were no being answering
to the Muslim conception associated with ‘Allah,’ but there were a being
answering perfectly to the Christian conception associated with ‘God’?
Might ‘Allah’ still refer to that being?” If the answer is affirmative, then
no reference shift has occurred; the information added by Muslims did
not come to dominate the dossiers of divine names, to have sine-qua-non
weight. If the answer is negative, however, then a reference shift has occurred. The information added by Muslims to the dossier of “Allah” was
given sine-qua-non weight and so, assuming the Christian view of history
is true, the dominant source of information in the dossier of “Allah” is no
longer God. The name has shifted from God to fiction.
Now consider the matter from the Islamic view of history. From this
perspective, Muslims’ use of “Allah” traces back to Abraham, and the
dominant source of information in the dossier is Allah himself. And, from
the perspective of Islam, Christians’ use of divine names has branched off
this main-line use of divine names, and Christians have contributed some
erroneous information to the dossier of “God,” e.g., that God is Triune,
that Jesus is the Son of God, etc. To test whether this new information
came to dominate the dossier of “God” as used by Christians, we ask
ourselves: “What if there were no being answering to the Christian conception associated with ‘God,’ but there were a being answering perfectly
to the Muslim conception associated with ‘Allah’? Might ‘God,’ as used
by Christians, still refer to that being?” If the answer is affirmative, then
no reference shift has occurred; the information added by Christians did
not come to dominate the dossiers of divine names, to have sine-qua-non
weight. If the answer is negative, however, then a reference shift has occurred. The information added by Christians to the dossier of “God” was
given sine-qua-non weight and so, assuming an Islamic view of history, the
dominant source of information in the dossier of “God” is no longer Allah.
The name has shifted from Allah to fiction.
Recall from above that we think sameness of worship requires sameness of reference. And we are now in a position to make progress on the
question of whether Muslims and Christians refer to the same God. This is
a question about the use of the divine names, and such questions must be
answered by the users of those names. We have addressed some questions
to you, the reader, who grasps and uses these names. We now ask you to
reflect on the practice of using “Allah” that is distinctive of Muslims, to reflect on the practice of using “God” that is distinctive of Christians, and to
participate in these name-using practices a bit. You needn’t be a member
of these religious communities in order to grasp and participate in their
name-using practices, just as you needn’t celebrate Christmas or believe in
Santa Claus in order to grasp and use the name “Santa Claus.”
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Let’s begin by testing whether, from a Muslim perspective, “God” as
used by Christians has shifted reference. To do so, spell out the whole
story of Islam here: there’s an omnipotent, omniscient creator of the world,
who spoke to Abraham, sent Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, etc., but this
creator is not a Trinity, has begotten no Son, etc. For a moment, suppose all
that is true. Might “God” still refer to that being?
Maybe your answer is “Yes.” One explanation of an affirmative answer
is that you’re using the name “God” in an attributive way, giving some
predicates in the dossier for “God” maximal weight, taking them to be
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the proper application of
the name. This isn’t some new, wild idea. You may recall that Thomas
Aquinas often ends his arguments for God’s existence with an inference
from there being an entity with such-and-such impressive attributes, to a
conclusion that “God” applies to that entity. For example, in his Summa
Theologica, Aquinas says: “Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence
of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from
another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of
as God,” and soon after “Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom
all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.”38
Unless Aquinas thinks those attributes are sufficient for the application of
“God,” he’s affirming the consequent in that last step, roughly: there is
something that is F; anything is God only if it is F; therefore this thing is God. But
affirming the consequent is a thing St. Thomas would never do. So it looks
like Aquinas was using the generic divine name in an attributive fashion,
taking some set of attributes to be sufficient for its application.
In his Vatican II declaration Nostra Aetate, Pope Paul VI said: “The
Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God.”
He seems there to endorse the view that Muslims worship the same God
that he does. And, in support or explanation of that position, he goes on to
give what looks like a list of attributes included in the dossier for “Allah”
that he takes to be sufficient for the application of “God”: “living and
subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven
and earth, who has spoken to men.”39 So it seems as though Pope Paul
VI, like Aquinas before him, used the generic divine name “God” in an
attributive way.
Peter Geach goes so far as to say that “the term ‘God’ is not a proper
name but a descriptive term: it is like ‘Prime Minister’ rather than ‘Mr.
Harold Wilson.’”40 And Geach even gives an argument for this: “Our
indication of this is the fact that one translates the word ‘God,’ as one
translates the words ‘Prime Minister,’ into a foreign language, whereas
‘Mr. Harold Wilson’ would be merely transcribed or transliterated.” But,
he admits, this isn’t a watertight (i.e., sound) argument, since occasionally
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. Q2. A3.
Pope Paul VI, Nostra Aetate.
40
Geach, God and the Soul, 108–109.
38
39
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proper names are indeed translated into new languages, and not merely
transcribed or transliterated. Take “Deutschland,” for example, which is
translated into English as “Germany.” Or take the Danish “Grønland,” a
proper name translated into English as “Greenland,” and into Spanish as
“Tierra Verde.” But even if Geach’s argument here fails, perhaps he’s right
that “God” functions much like names of offices or positions, and is used
attributively, so that some set of attributes is considered sufficient for its
application.
So, if you answered affirmatively to our question above, it may be because you use “God” as Thomas Aquinas, Pope Paul VI, Peter Geach, and
others have used it, in this attributive way, and these attributes are, on the
Muslim view, had by Allah.41 But there are other possibilities. Perhaps you
use the name deferentially, taking name-users such as Aquinas and Pope
Paul VI to be experts. Or perhaps, less plausibly, you use the name demonstratively, and take yourself to have demonstrated, at some point in the
past, with your use of “God,” the same entity that Muslims call “Allah.”42
On the other hand, perhaps you answered “No” to our question above.
Perhaps, that is, you think that if there were nothing answering perfectly
to the information in the dossier for “God,” but there were something
answering perfectly to the information in the dossier for “Allah,” nevertheless “God” could not refer to that thing. This indicates that there is some
information in the dossier for “God” that you give sine-qua-non weight,
and which you take to be radically incongruous with some information
in the dossier for “Allah.” We’d venture to guess that this is some information constitutive of distinctively Christian doctrines, for example the
Trinity, the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, or the Resurrection. According to
you, then, this information has become central in the dossier for “God” as
used by Christians. And so, according to you, if Islam is true, Allah could
no longer be the dominant source of information in the dossier for “God,”
and there has been a reference shift in the Christian use of “God,” from
Allah to fiction.
Summing up so far: if you answered the question above affirmatively,
then you think that, from the perspective of Islam, Christians and Muslims may well be referring to and worshiping the same God. So long
as Allah remains the dominant source of information in the dossier for
“God”—and the historical facts seem to bear this out, from the perspective
of Islam—then Christians do refer to Allah when they use “God.” However, if you answered the question negatively, then you think that, from
the perspective of Islam, Christians are not referring to—and therefore not
41
It’s an interesting question whether, as Geach thought, “God” functions in this way
more like a title or an office rather than a typical proper name. And it might be interesting to
ask Aquinas, Pope Paul VI, Geach, and others whether their answer to our question changes
if, instead of a generic divine name like “God,” we inquire about a personal divine name,
such as “Yahweh.”
42
On this score, Geach (God and the Soul, 109) is doubtful: “‘God’ is a descriptive term; and
in this life we know God not as an acquaintance whom we can name, but by description.”
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worshiping—the same deity that Muslims refer to and worship. (A third
option is that you think the answer is unclear, and you say neither “yea”
nor “nay.” It’s a borderline case, you might think: there is no determinate
fact of this matter, at least none we’re in a position to affirm).
Now let’s turn to the Christian perspective. Has “Allah,” as used by
Muslims, shifted reference from God to fiction? To test this, spell out
the whole story of Christianity here: there’s an omnipotent, omniscient
creator of the world, who spoke to Abraham, Moses, etc., and who so
loved the world that He sent His only begotten Son, exists as a Trinity,
etc. But no Person in this Trinity, nor any divine messenger, ever spoke to
Muhammad. His experiences on the Mountain of Light were a hallucination, or a fabrication, etc. The Qur’an is not a revelation from God. For a
moment, suppose all that is true. Might “Allah,” as used by Muslims, still
refer to that being?
Perhaps you answer affirmatively. As before, this is likely because you’re
using the name “Allah” in an attributive way, giving some predicates in
the dossier for “Allah” maximal weight, taking them to be individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for the proper application of the name. Perhaps, like Geach, you think of divine names—especially generic divine
names like “God” and “Allah”—as operating much like abbreviated definite descriptions, pointing to a minimalistic “God of the Philosophers”
sort of being, and anything meeting the description gets the name. But,
again, there are other possibilities. Perhaps you use “Allah” deferentially,
taking name-users who answer the question affirmatively to be experts,
or perhaps you use the name demonstratively, and take yourself to have
demonstrated, at some point in the past, with your use of “Allah,” the
same entity that Christians call “God.”
On the other hand, perhaps you answer the question negatively,
thinking that, if the Christian story is true, “Allah” could not refer to God.
This shows that there is some information in the dossier for “Allah” that
you take to be central, and which you take to be radically incongruous
with the Christian conception of God. Likely you take this information to
concern the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Crucifixion, or the Resurrection.
Or perhaps your interpretation of some verses of the Qur’an lead you to believe that it’s central to the conception associated with “Allah” that Allah
is not omnibenevolent, and you think this radically mismatches the Christian conception of God who loves the whole world (Jn. 3:16), who loves
and dies for sinners (Rom. 5:8), etc.43 According to you, then, information
radically incongruous with the Christian conception of God has become
dominant in the dossier for “Allah” as used by Muslims. And so, for you,
if Christianity is true, there has been a reference shift in the Muslim use
of “God,” from God to fiction. (Again, a third option is to answer neither
43
Read through the suwar of the Qur’an, and you’ll find twenty or so descriptions of those
Allah does not love, for example those given to excess (5:90, 7:55), the corrupt (2:205, 5:67),
the sinners (3:57, 42:40), and the unbelievers (2:276, 3:32).
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“yes” nor “no,” and to say that the matter is a borderline case on a spectrum between clear cases of reference shifts and clear cases of reference
preservation. On this option, there is no determinate fact of the matter, or
at least none we’re in a position to affirm.)
Let us say a brief word on the Muslim conception of “Allah” with
regard to Trinitarianism, on the chance that it may impact your answer
to our above question. While Trinitarianism and the Qur’an’s commitment to God’s Oneness appear incompatible, there is some debate about
the language used in the Qur’an to reject the Christian conception of the
Trinity. Miroslav Volf suggests that the Qur’an rejects a heretical conception of the Trinity, one that orthodox Christians should also reject.44
For example, the first objection to Trinitarianism raised in the Qur’an is,
“They do blaspheme who say: God is one of three in a Trinity: for there
is no God except One God.”45 But this assertion, Volf points out, is consistent with orthodox Christian beliefs about the Trinity: to call God one of
three in a Trinity would be to “slip into polytheism,” which is clearly inconsistent with Christian doctrine. Similarly, the Qur’an asserts “that we
worship none but God; that we associate no partners with him; that we
erect not, from among ourselves, Lords and patrons other than God.”46
The Qur’an seems to be confronting a conception of God in which Jesus
Christ and the Holy Spirit are considered partners or associates of God.
Here too we find no contradiction with orthodox Christianity. In sum, it
may well be that the Qur’an fails to accurately characterize and engage
Trinitarianism, and so no genuinely anti-Trinitarian information is found
in the dossier of “Allah.” This might incline some readers further toward
an affirmative answer to our question above, and toward the view that,
from a Christian perspective, there has been no reference shift in “Allah”
from God to fiction.
Conclusion
So, do Muslims and Christians worship the same God? We’ve helped you
discern whether, assuming Christianity is true, erroneous, source-less information has become dominant in the dossier of “Allah,” in which case
there’s been a reference shift in “Allah” from God to fiction. And we’ve
helped you discern whether, assuming Islam is true, erroneous, sourceless information has become dominant in the dossier of “God,” in which
case there’s been a reference shift in “God” from Allah to fiction.
You might think there’s been a reference shift in both cases, or in one
but not the other, or in neither case. If you think there’s been a reference
shift in both cases, then Christians and Muslims do not refer to—and, so,
do not worship—the same God. If you think there’s been a reference shift
Volf, Allah.
Volf, Allah, 132.
46
Volf, Allah, 131.
44
45
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in one case but not the other, then whether Christians and Muslims refer
to and worship the same God will depend on whether you think Islam or
Christianity is true. If you think there’s been a reference shift in neither
case, then the path is open, on your view, for Christians and Muslims to
refer to, and perhaps worship, the same God.47
A complete answer to the question of worship would require discovering what conditions, in addition to reference, are required for worship,
and whether Christians and Muslims both meet those conditions. That’s
a task best left to theologians on both sides. Here, we’ll briefly sketch the
outlines of such an answer. First, Islamic and Christian theologians would
each have to discover what conditions could make an act of worship
unacceptable: perhaps idolatry, half-heartedness, hypocrisy, arrogantly
innovative styles of worship, the use of keytars, etc. Then, Christian theologians would have to decide whether Islamic forms of worship meet
those conditions sometimes, always, or never. And Islamic theologians
would have to do the same, with respect to Christian forms of worship. At
the end of this inquiry, we’d be in a position to decide whether Muslims
and Christians—given that they refer to the same God—manage to worship the same God sometimes, always, or never. Again, this is a task best
left to theologians. But we’ll go on the record as saying we’d be surprised
if it turned out that—assuming they refer to the same God—Muslims and
Christians never successfully worship the same God.
We close with one further reflection, on the connection between worship
and salvation from a Christian perspective. Biblical evidence suggests that,
even if Muslims aren’t successfully referring to God when they worship,
God may well still accept their worship, i.e., credit it to them as if they had
worshiped him. For example, we learn in Matthew 25 that Jesus accepts
charity done to “the least of these” as charity done to him. What goes with
acts of charity not directed at God may also go with acts of worship not
directed at God. Also, Christians should not rest complacent with their
successful reference to God, since directing worship toward God is likely
not sufficient for that worship to be accepted. As we suggested above,
there are likely unacceptable forms of worship. And Matthew 7:22 tells us
that even some who call upon Jesus as “Lord, Lord”—i.e., even some who
successfully refer to Jesus with honor and deference—will be sent away
from him, and Jesus will claim he never knew them, because they didn’t
do the will of the Father.48 Appreciating the disconnect between worship
and salvation could, as it were, lower the temperature of the discussion.

47
If you abstained from both of the questions, thinking that the answers are too unclear to
say “yes” or “no,” then, according to you, it’s unclear (or indeterminate) whether Christians
and Muslims worship the same God. If you abstained from one but not the other, then your
answer to the “Same God?” question will depend on when you abstained, and which (if
either) of the two religions you think is true.
48
See also Isaiah 1:10–20.
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From a Christian perspective at least, salvation may well not hinge on
“worshiping the same God.”49
Pepperdine University
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